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ILLINOIS State/Criminal Timely 
1. SUMMARY. Appt claims that the state statute 
authorizing the search of those present at premises subject to 
search under a warrant is unconstitutional as applied to the 




2. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW. The police obtained a 
valid warrant to search a certain tavern and its bartender to 
look for controlled substances and related paraphernalia. The 
complaint requesting the search warrant stated that an informer 
of proven reliability had been present at the bar on at least 
eleven occasions, had seen the bartender in possession of tin 
foil packets of the kind used to package heroin, and had reason 
to believe that on March 1, 1976 . heroin would be sold at the 
bar. 
The warrant was executed on March 1. The officers 
found about a dozen patrons, among whom was appt, at what the 
state appellate court describes as a "dismal, drab and shabby 
type establishment consisting of one room." All persons present 
were detained and subject to a pat-down search. In appt's case, 
the officers searched him once, discovering only a cigarette 
package. A few minutes later he was searched again, and this 
time six tin foil packets of heroin were discovered in his 
pocket. It is not claimed that anything about appt's appearance 
or conduct gave the police reason to suspect him, more than any 
of the other patrons, of possessing the drugs. 
Appt moved unsuccessfully to suppress the heroin, and 
was convicted and sentenced to two years probation. The search 
was upheld on the basis of a state statute that provides: 
In the execution of -the warrant the person 
executing the same may reasonably detain to search 
any person in the place at the time: 
2. 
·"--"' 
(a) To protect himself from attack, or 
(b) To prevent the disposal or concealment of 
any instruments, articles or things particularly 
described in the warrant. 
The state court of appeals affirmed. It made clear in 
its opinion that the statute, as construed in previous state-
court decisions, did not authorize general warrants or the 
search of all persons found present at any premises to be 
searched. Based on the facts of this case, however, the court 
concluded that the search was proper: Narcotics are easily 
capable of being concealed on persons present; the complaint 
referred to probable sales of controlled substances by the 
bartender (presumably to those present), there were not so many 
people in the room, and the tavern was not so large, that 
searching all those present was unreasonable under the 
circumstances; appt was not an innocent stranger having no 
connection with the premises. The court compared the facts of 
this case with others from Illinois and other States with 
similar statutes. It concluded that the requirements of the 
Fourth Amendment had been met. The state supreme court denied 
leave to appeal. 
3. CONTENTIONS. Appt contends that the court below 
construed the statute to permit general warrants and the search 
of all those present at a place described in a warrant, even if 
the police have no cause to suspect any wrongdoing by them. He 





present at the tavern were illegal activity was suspected, and 
that "mere presence" is insufficient to give probable to search. 
He ~urther claims that even if the first pat-down were 
permissible, the police were not entitled to search him a second 
time, since the first search gave them no reason to suspect he 
had concealed weapons or contraband. All this, says appt, 
-. 
violates the Fourth Amendment. He claims that other States with 
similar statutes have construed their laws more narrowly, and 
that this case conflicts with those. 
4. DISCUSSION. Appt does not fairly represent the 
holding the of the court below. Its opinion made clear that the 
statute does not authorize general warrants or the search of 
anyone present at any place subject to search under a warrant. 
It grounded its opinion in the specific facts of the case, as 
described above. Since the officers had probable cause to 
believe that narcotics were being sold at the tavern, it does 
not seem unreasonable under the circumstances to search the 
potential buyers present there. The second pat-down of appt 
does raise some questions, but if the officers were entitled to 
search him the first time, a second search moments later 
probably should not require additional justification. 
Because the court below tied its holding to the 
particular facts of this case, and because appt apparently makes 
only an as-applied attack on the statute, the case does not 
appear suitable for review in any event. 
There is no response. 
2/1/79 Andersen op. in petn. 
4. 
Court ................... . Voted on .... . .... . ........ , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned ....... . ..... . .... , 19 . . . 




Justice Powell did not vote in any of the cases for the 3/23/79 
Conference. 
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An Illinois statute authorizes, where police 
~· . 
pursuant to valid warrant search a "place" to "search any 
person in the place . ~~ . (a) to protect himself from 
or (b) to prevent the disposal or concealment of 
articles or things particularly described in the warrant". 
~. ,.:~~,';;,., The place involved in this case was a 
room bar. The warrant to search it, describing only the 
place and the bartender, is not challenged. The application 
for the warrant was explicit that the bar was a place where 
heroin was sold (and, I believe, used). The warrant itself 
authorized the seizure of "evidence of the offense of 
possession of a controlled substance", including "heroin". 
The police searched all 12 persons found in the 
bar, most of whom were patrons. Appellant was a patron on 
whom heroin was found. The state contends that 
f uf9~ 
was authorized by !'erry principles to "patdown" these 
persons; that, upon the patdown of appellant, the officer 
felt a "pack" - li~e a ~~lette pack - that contained some 
hard substance; and th'ft"" this provided probable cause for. a 
second and complete search that turned up heroin. Appellant 
disputes this version of the facts. 
The state of Illinois advances two grounds in 
support of the decision of the Illinois Appellate Court. 
first is limited to the facts of this case, which are 
described as a Terry-type situation where the officer had 
authority to patdown the appellant and thereafter had 
probable casue t6 ' ~earch. The state argues that the 
constitutional issue can and should be avoided on this 
theory. 
r; 
The "alternative" ground for affirmance is that the 
~ Illinois statute, properli construed, - is valid: that a state 
. ~ 
must have the authority - in situations like the present case 
- to authorize what in effect is a general warrant search of 
persons present in a place whera there is reasonable belief 
that contraband is located or beinq dispensed, or where other 
products or instrumentalities of crime may be secreted on 
persons present. 
It is said in an amicus brief (supporting 
affirmance) that all decided state court cases have 
similar searches either on the basis of state statutes or 
-~
principles of Terry. Cases in the District of Columbia and 
Georgia are particularly relied upon. An article by LaFave 
also is cited. See the state's brief p. 36. 
. .. 
3. 
If traditional 4th Amendment analysis is applied, 
the answer in this cas~ is too easy: The warrant was invalid 
because it authorized a blanket search of all persons present 
with no specific information that any of them possessed 
contraband. If a one-room bar justifies such a search, 
does one draw the line? 
But there should be a better answer to the 
involved than the foregoing. There is no way in which law 
enforcement authorities, in this case or similar ones, can 
known in advance o w~ll be present when a particular, place 
is . vali<!!Y_ sea~hed for contraband o-~her ev~ence of 
crime. As the nppendices to the state's brief, and examples 
cited in professor Inbauq's brief abundantly show, police 
confront two serious problems in this situation: (i) the 
real danger that someone present will have a weapon and, ~ 
perhaps under the influence of drugs use it: and (ii) the 
danger, at least equally if not more likely, is that the 
' evidence or fruit~ of an obvious crime will be secreted or 
lost. Al~ persons present certainly could ~ be arrested. 
Thus, they could walk out with the evidence. Indeed, 
technique is legally available, the persons operating a bar 
or other place where drugs are dispensed, could simply take 
the precaution whenever open for business to secrete all 
drugs on a few friends or regular customers. 
4. 
The Illinois statute well may be invalid, as it 
~~
appears on its face to authorize indiscriminate search or 
persons present in any place - large or small - which 
officers are authorized to search. Certainly, there must be 
some limitation. The Illinois court says that each case must -
be decided on ~~s. 
I consider this a case of major importance to law 
~--------------~ 
enforcement, and would like some careful thinking by all of 
us as to a principled answer to the answer - one that would 
be protective ~le~itimate 4th Amendment rights and the 
public interes~ in effective law enforcement. 
in terms of the one-room bar involved in this ca$e, there 
probably was no leqitimate expectation of privacy by most if 
not all of ~he' patrons. But this cannot be said about 




Perhaps an answer might follow general Terry 
principles - though stretche« a bit - as follows: Where a 
warrant states with particularity that certain persons are 
known to frequent the target place apparently for 
pnrticipation in illegal activity, and describes the 
likelihood of sucrf.ersons secreting or leaving with critical 
5. 
evidence, or of having weapons on their persons, some sort 
questioning may be justified. 
~ ~ 1'/JJ -~~ UJ - v...(). ~ ~ ,9 
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~! BEN~ORANDUM ~ ~ t-r,/ ./ .L~ ~ ~¢ 9 ~L.4lJ-L- '-J) 
~~ ~ e,ck.u.12 CJ_ 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell T~, ~ ,..e...v: "7' ~ .. 
FROM: David 2. 9L--e... S~. :5~~{§)-~ ~-, 
~~d-~6-f~~ ~..u--A-/t-4.1~...4..4U 
DATE: ~;;~~~.J..o~£¥~).J.o 
RE: No. 78-5937, Ybarra v. Illinois ~)-k~ 
~~~ ~~h_~~ 
~./.L./..#~ II_ '_ • .) 
~rrv--...-y- "'-~~) LA-~ B-? ¥ u, &A.,.,.~· 
This case presents two questions:~ ~~~~.~l-A~ 
~~~ ~~:.=--~~ 
.1) ~hen the police executed ~e~~ warrant at 
~~~~4._~;,.-~ 
the Auror5, _ T~p wer~ they justifieq J _n conducting a Terry 
~~· ~a-~4/::1-j~~~:&~~ 
frisk of all patrons, and in then r: ~rning to isk 
~~~tt-~~~~~~ 
Ybarra; K..t_ Lf'!:"~ .. ~ 1-tuz. 4 4111l: 
~ .t/1-f ~!::-~ ~4'Y'-4-
and 2) Is the Fou;;,th Amendment violated by Il].. _ 
d.oo#*eL"',~-.1- ~~4-Lbt~~ 
Rev. Stat~ C}1.. 38 .. § 108-9 (1975), which permits a ,I;?Olice 
~Jl.D ~~~A' ua_._. ~,}44"'~ 
officer executing a search warrant to s~archaJl people on ·~/ 
1
/ 
~)lllll'.~./a.<a,·h-~~p~., S~ft.}d /r; "' , 17. 
the premises "(a) to protect himself from attack or (b) to J 
prevent the disposal or concealment of • . . articles or 
--~ ---
things particularly described in the warrant? 
I. The Raid -- Based on firsthand observation and 
a tip from a reliable informant, the police obtained a 
warrant to search for heroin at the Aurora Tap, a grubby, 
one-room bar, on March 1, 1976. The warrant also specified 
that "Greg" the bartender should be searched. According to 
• I 
2. 
testimony by Agent Johnson of the Illinois Bureau of 
Investigation (IBI), the warrant was executed by three IBI 
agents, two officials of the Aurora Police Department, and 
several uniformed officers of that department, or about 
eight police personnel in all. A.24. When they entered 
the bar between 4 and 4:30 in the afternoon, the pol ice 
found approximately 12 people clustered at the bar. The 
light was dim in the large room, but Agent Johnson said he 
could see all the people inside. 
After announcing that they had a warrant to search 
the place Agent Johnson frisked everyone. Ybarra, who was .............._ 
standing at the bar drinking a beer, was casually dressed. 
Johnson had never seen Ybarra before, and Ybarra's 
appearance and actions did not strike him as suspicious. ,, 
ll 
At the suppression hearing, Johnson testified that during 
this first pat-down he felt a cigarette pack with objects 
.---- ------------------------------------------
in it. Johnson then agreed with the prosecutor's statement 
that three minutes later, after frisking other patrons, he 
returned to Ybarra and searched his pockets. At the full 
X ~ ~--------------------------
trial, however, Johnson's story was somewhat ~t. He -
stated that he first frisked Ybarra for weapons, and then 
came back to him to search for "controlled substances" 
about fifteen minutes later. A.49. The second search did 
not involve simply a review of Ybarra's pockets, but was a 
full pat-down from neck to toes. A.50, A.61. Ybarra 
----~---------------------
himself testified that first Johnson patted him down, then 
the agent returned to check Ybarra's shoes, and then 
3. 
finally Johnson patted him down again before reaching into 
his pockets. A.63-64. In any event, Johnson found six 
tinfoil packets of heroin in Ybarra's pockets. The entire 
raid netted those six packets, two baqgies with "green 
plant-like substance," hypodermic needles, a spoon, and 
several packages of fireworks. 
II. Proceedings Below Ybarra was indicted for 
unlawful possession of heroin. He unsuccessfully moved to 
suppress the heroin as evidence on the ground that the 
police had no probable cause to search him and he was not 
named in the warrant. The trial court denied the motion on 
the basis of § 108-9. Ybarra was convicted and sentenced 
to two years probation. The Illinois Appellate Court for 
the Second District upheld the conviction, ruling that 
although the sort of "blanket search" undertaken by the 
police in this case would not have been appropriate in "a 
large retail or commercial establishment," it was all right 
"in a one-room bar where it is obvious from the complaint 
of the officer seeking the search warrant that heroin was 







The Terry Frisk --
in the court below, 
The state did not offer ~ 
and appellant has no
in this court (though a reply brief may be 





the court upholds the ~ issues. As the state argues, if 
search 
7~ ~ 
of Ybarra on tTH:-5- ground, there is no need to &It' 
------------~------~----------------------~ 
consider the constitutionality of the statute. I see the 
question as involving two steps: A) Did the police 
officers have the right to subject all the occupants of the 
Aurora Tap to a weapons pat-down? and B) Did that initial 
frisk provide probable cause for Officer Johnson to return 
and search Ybarra's pockets? 
Agent Johnson conceded ~ 
that he had no basis for singling Ybarra out for frisking. ~ 
Instead, the state contends that the police were justifie~~ 
A) The first pat-down 
in searching all the patrons. ?.JJ.A" ~ + The state claims that it is --~r~ 
always dangerous to execute narcotics search warrants 
because drug dealers are frequently armed and violent. 
Accordingly, a Terry frisk is always appropriate in such 
circumstances. The important feature of this argument is 
its departure from traditional Fourth Amendment 
methodology. Rather than demonstrate the need for a 
weapons pat-down in each search warrant situation, the ~ 
state proposes a per se rule that all warrants to search 5~ 
for drugs may be enforced with a Terry frisk. This Court~ 
~~ 
has emphasized the importance of supporting circumstances ~? 
to justify the· intrusion of a pat-down. Compare Terry v. ~~ 
c..f: 
Ohio (furtive movements over extended period of time); and ~
Adams v. Williams (reliable tip that suspect was armed; ~ 
officer approached parked car in high-crime neighborhood at 
2:15 a.m.; suspect was uncooperative); with United States 
5. 
v; - Brignoni-Ponce (cannot make roving border check merely 
because occupants of car are Mexican); and United States v. 
Sibron (consorting with known drug addicts does justify 
frisk). The state has offered little support for 
abandoning this focus on the facts of each case. Indeed, 
the data presented in the Report of the Drug Enforcement 
Administration, Appendix B of appellee's brief, do not 
supJ?ort such a per se rule. Of the 7 2 assaults on drug f ;u.J-
enforcement officers analyzed in that report, none took 
place during the execution of a search warrant. Appellee's 
brief, 5a. 
S /_7 ~ The state's second position on this point is that ~~
the situation at the Aurora TA.:Js so dangerous that the C_ 
Terry frisk was appropriate. The state cites very little~ ......... L~ 
. "' ,~
evidence in support of this claim. The search warrant and _ ~ 
underlying affidavit make no mention of the presence of /3~ 
~
weapons in the tavern, or of a pattern of ~iolence there in
the past. The state points to no action by one of the 
bar's occupants or suspicious bulge in anyone's clothing. 
See Smith v. State, 227 S.E.2d 911 (1976) (no basis for 
patdown of customer at searched barber shop since there was 
no reason to think he was armed and dangerous) • 
Admittedly, the search took place in a dimly-lit, down-at-
the-heels bar, but the police were present in sufficient 
force for some to search while others watched the bar's 
occupants. Finally, the state's proffered empirical data 
does not support the claim that drug enforcement agents are 
6. 
particularly at risk when searching a place like the Aurora 
Tap. Of the 72 assaults cited by the report in appellees' 
brief, 27 took place in automobiles, 20 in open areas, 13 - - -in private residences; any assaults in bars or restaurants 
would have to be subsumed in the catchall "Other" category 
covering 10 assaults. ~ 
,#A- ro 
I would expect that the presence of 
witnesses would deter assaults on law enforcement agents in 
such establishments. ~lr. 
B. The Second Search 
~
Johnson stated that ~ 
following the first frisk he was satisfied that Ybarra had ~ 
no weapon, and that Ybarra did nothing in the interim to ~ 
~~ change that opinion. A.28-29. So even if the first pat- H 
down was justified, the state must establish probable cause ~6r~ 
'- ttt~A-;' 
for Johnson's second search of Ybarra. The evidence on ; ' , 
-
this question is not clear. As noted above, Johnson 
testified at the suppression hearing that he felt a 
cigarette pack with hard objects in it during the first 
pat-down, and that after he searched the other people in 
the bar he returned to retrieve the cigarette pack. Under 
this version the Terry frisk would have revealed the 
presence of contraband (the supporting affidavit 
specifically referred to tin-foil packets of heroin), and 
Johnson had probable cause for a more complete search. 
Testimony at trial, however, calls this version into 
question. Both Johnson and Ybarra agreed that the second 
search was a full pat-down, from neck to toes. If Johnson 
had suspected that the cigarette pack contained heroin, why 
7. 
did he not simply take that from Ybarra's pockets? Possibly 
after searching all the patrons and the premises and 
finding 1 it tle, the pol ice decided to search the people 
again (it is noteworthy that the final haul from the Aurora ---Tap raid was rather modest) • ....- An alternative view is that 
after frisking the other patrons, Johnson could not 
remember precisely where the suspicious cigarette pack had 
been on Ybarra, so he had to pat Ybarra down again. 
Assuming that the seizure was proper, the question 
arises as to the admissibility of "windfall" evidence that 
is discovered during a Terry search. Although this Court } 
has not directly ruled on this point, m'('t courts ~ve Y 
admitted such evidence. E.g., Guzman v. Estelle, 493 F.2d 
532 (5th Cir. 1974); Colding v. State, 536 S.W.2d 106 (Ark. 
1976); State v. Yarbrough, 552 P.2d 1318 (Or.App. 1976); 
but cf. United States v. DelToro, 464 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 
1972) (court rejects policeman's claim that he thought a 
folded ten-dollar bill containing cocaine might be a 
concealed razor blade). There is a potential for police to 
use the frisk as a fishing expedition based on no more than 
intuition, but few take Prof. Amsterdam's position that the \ 
only admissible evidence that can come out of a weapons 
pat-down is weapons. Such a rule could demoralize both 
police and citizenry by permitting known crimes to go 
unpunished. The American Law Institute in its Model Pre- IJ L / 
Arraignment Code suggests that because the Terry frisk is ~ 
most subject to abuse in gambling and narcotics 
' .. 
-~ I. 
J. ~ )..1; ',.JI-
··~~.~~ 
~~ ~ 8. 
investigationsj, the police should be denied the stop-and-
frisk power in such investigations. Then, the ALI reasons, 
the windfall problem would rarely arise. 19 7 5 Draft , at 
281-282. This approach also seems a bit extreme. The 
Terry stop responds to the problems of danger to policemen 
and the need to prevent incipient crime. Both factors may 
be present with respect to narcotics and gambling offenses. 
middle ground on this problem might follow the 
Uniform Arrest Act in permitting police to detain for up to 
------ _M..;~~ .... ""' 
two hours suspicious individuals discovered on the premises 
the execution of a search warrant. See pp. 20-21, 
infra. In that period, the police may question the person 
to determine if there is probable cause to search him, or 
they may seek a personal search warrant from a magistrate. 
It " 
Overview of Terry issue As the preceding ~ c. 
~ 
discussion suggests, the Terry issue is not well-presented~~ 
in this case. Neither the examination of witnesses nor the ~ ~ 
presentations by counsel were addressed to the problem. 
The contention was not raised in the court below, and the 
state did not argue it before this court in its motion to 
dismiss. Because the issue is not well-framed, and in view 
of its intricacy and importance, it would be preferable for 
the Court to sidestep the state's Terry claim. This record 
provides little basis for deciding questions like the 
proper scope of a Terry frisk in the execution of a search 
~~ 
warrant and the handling of "windfall" evidence from such ;V o.:f" 




originally noted jurisdiction is not so difficult, nor its 
resolution so potentially disruptive, that prudential or 
federalism considerations would suggest that the Terry 
ground be seized for decision. 
This Court has repeatedly refused to decide 
consitutional issues that were not raised in state courts, 
primarily out of concern over the Court's jurisidiction 
over such claims. See Stern & Grossman, Supreme Court 
Practice 704 (5th ed. 1978); Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 
U.S. 437, 438 (1969), Ramsey v. United Mine Workers, 401 
U.S. 302, 312 (1971); Tacon v. Arizona, 410 U.S. 351, 352 
(1973). These cases, however, all involve questions 
pressed by a petitioner or appellant, n~t by a respondent 
or appellee. Still, valid (if not jurisdictional) concerns 
support applying this policy to appellees: "Questions not 
raised below are those on which the record is very likely 
. . 
to be inadequate, since it was certainly not compiled with 
those questions in mind. And in a federal system it is 
important that state courts be given the first opportunity 
to consider the applicability of state statutes in light of 
constitutional challenge. " Cardinale, supra, 394 U.S. 
at 439. Still, I am n~t sure the Court can avoid the Terry ~ 
One~ problem without . ·seeming either craven or dense. 
approach might be to remand for consideration of the Terry ~ -
rationale in the court below. 
Were the Court to meet the Terry issue head-on, I 
would resist the assertion that a Terry frisk is justified 
in the execution of all 
r-/ 10. 
narcotics search warrants. Such a 
departure from settled Fourth Amendment practices seems 
unwarranted. Similarly, I am troubled by the contention 
that the circumstances in the Aurora Tap justified the 
general pat-down. The bar was hardly a showplace, but the 
state can point to no particular factor as establishing the 
likelihood of violence or danger. By accepting the state's 
argument on these facts the Court might well open the door 
to a signficant expansion of the Terry doctrine and an 
endless exercise in linedrawing. Would a weapons pat-down 
be justified in a posh establishment like Studio 54, where --- LA-
L/ ~ 7, the presence of drugs is beyond doubt but where there may r~
be more or less likelihood of violence? Or at a Mafia 
hangout like Umberto's Clam House in Little Italy, which is 
a fine, well-lit restaurant? What factors were present at 
the Aurora Tap that should be looked for in the future? 
Size? Lighting? Clientele? This strikes me as 
a \ by definitional swamp that the Court would do well to avoid 
deciding that there was no basis for the Terry pat-down. 
Should the Court determine that the first pat-down 
was appropriate, I suspect that the second search was 
permissible. As indicated above, I do not think it is 
entirely clear on this record that Agent Johnson had 
probable cause for the second search, but under one 
interpretation of the record, he would have had probable 
cause. Again, my doubts on the factual basis for this 
determination reinforce the idea that the Terry claim 
) .. ' \ ·~ 
11. 
should be viewed as not properly raised in this case. The 
windfall evidence should probably be admissible. This 
Court cannot legitimately ask policemen to avert their eyes 
from illegality and let lawbreakers stroll off. 
IV. The Constitutionality of the Search --
Section 108-9 provides: ------ "In the execution of the warrant the person executing the same may reasonably detain 
to search any person in the place at the time: (a) To 
protect himself from attack, or (b) To prevent the disposal 
or concealment of any instruments, articles or things 
particularly described in the warrant." (Emphasis added.) 
Similar statutes have been enacted in nine 
Appellee's Brief, at 22. Subsection (a) of 
other states. ~ 
Section 108-9 ~ 
should be seen as a codification of Terry for the warrant 
situation. To the extent that subsection (a) attempts to 
grant police officers authority to conduct a full search 
when they sense danger in executing a warrant, the statute 
probably upsets the delicate balance struck by this Court 
in Terry. Somewhat surprisingly, however, the state relies ~~ 
--
entirely on subsection (b) in this case, as did the court~ 
below. Accordingly, this Court should focus on the ~ 
"~ '~ 
absconding-with-the-evidence provision. The central ~ 
t~_;,.~~/. -~ 
inquiry is whether the statute grants too-broad discretion-
to the executing officer, and thereby thwarts the warrant ~" 
procedure's requirement of review by an independent 
magistrate. Marron · v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 
1 2. 
(1927). 
Appellant argues that this statute could not 
constitutionally authorize the search in this case in the 
absence of circumstances presenting probable cause. The 
analogy is drawn to a "general warrant" which authorizes 
the search of a premises and "all persons" found there. 
Appellee responds that the statute constitutionally 
authorized the search because of the connection between the 
Aurora Tap's patrons and the tavern's "open and notorious" 
drug trade. The Illinois courts might have attempted to 
\ 
avoid constitutional problems by reading the statutory 
language "may reasonably detain" as injecting a probable 
cause requirement. This course was taken by the 
Connecticut courts in construing a similar statute that 
referred to the officer's "reason to believe" that he was 
in danger or that evidence would be carried away. State v. 
Preece, 260 A.2d 413, 418 (Conn.Cir. 1969). The Connecticut 
approach has much to commend it. 
A. Probable Cause Appellant argues that in the 
absence of probable cause, a search of an individual on 
premises covered by a search warrant will violate the 
Fourth Amendment's requirement that there be specific and 
The articulable bases for any offic~ search. 
relevant opinion by this Court is United · States v. 
most 
DiRe, 
332 U.S. 581 (1948), involving a conviction for possession 
of counterfeit gasoline coupons during World War II. In 
,~ . . 
1 3. 
that case, an informant told the police that he was going 
to buy counterfeit coupons from Buti tia in his car at a 
certain time and place. At the appointed time, the 
authorities approached the car with a warrant for Butitia's 
arrest and found Buti tia, the informant, and DiRe. DiRe 
was taken to the police station, and a subsequent search 
revealed that he had several phony gasoline coupons. On 
appeal, the Government conceded that a warrant to search a 
house would not also authorize the police to search people 
within the house, but argued that presence in an automobile 
being used for illegal purposes raises a higher likelihood 
of participation in wrongdoing. The Supreme Court 
overturned DiRe's conviction, ruling that if the Government 
could not use a search warrant to expand the scope of 
search in a house, the same principle applied to arrests in 
automobiles. The Court stated, "We are not convinced that 
a person, by mere presence in a suspected car, loses 
immunities from search of his person to which he would 
otherwise be entitled." Id. at 587. 
Although appellant attempts to make a great deal 
out of DiRe, I doubt that it controls this case. First, 
the sort of intermediate police investigation sanctioned by 
this Court since Terry calls into question the relevance of 
the Court's holding in 1947. We now have a far more 
sophisticated Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, at least in 
part as a response to more sophisticated criminals. 




~~~~ . · 
in 1948 on the search of houses could be held against it 
now, but it surely cannot be the basis for ruling against 
Illinois here. Finally, DiRe did not involve a search 
pursuant to a warrant, but one incident to arrest. 
I think more useful guidance can be derived from 
state decisions on a police officer's power to search 
individuals who are on premises for which he has a search 
warrant. Frequently such cases have involved a "general 
warrant. Although no "blanket search" authority can be 
justified in the execution of all warrants, some 
circumstances may justify searching individuals who are not 
-------------~ ~-------------------------------
named in the search warrant and for whom there would not be 
probable cause to search in a different setting. In 
particular, courts have focused on the distinction between 
, I ,, I l \.1 
searches of public establishments and of private homes. 
First, only one state court has approved the 
search of individuals who are not named in a search warrant 
for a commercial establishment. Colding v. State, supra. 
Thirteen state courts have overturned convictions based on 
evidence seized during such a search of a person in a 
public place. State v. Procce, supra (small variety 
store); State v. Wise, 284 A.2d 292 (Del. 1971) (small 
grocery store); Brown v. Wainwright, 337 So. 2d 416 
(Fla.App. 1976) (ABC Lounge); State v. Cochran, 217 S.E.2d 
181 (Ga.App. 1975) (night club); Purkey v. Mabey, 193 P. 79 
(Idaho 1920) (cigar store); McAllister v. State, 306 
N.E.2d 395 (Ind.App. 1974) (Blue River Inn); State v. 
1 5. 
Sims, 382 A.2d 638 (N.J. 1978) (gas station office); State 
v. Riggins, 351 A.2d 406 (N.J. Super. 1976) (T & J Tavern); --""-.,._,__ 
State v. Helton, 369 A.2d 10 (1975) (tavern); People v. 
Nieves, 330 N.E.2d 26 (1975) (restaurant); Garrett v. 
State, 270 P.2d 1101 (Okl.Cr. 1954) (gas station and beer 
tavern); Crossland v. State, 266 P.2d 649 (Okl.Crim.App. 
1954) (cafe with 25 customers and ten employees); State v. 
Massie, 120 S.E. 514 (W.Va. 1923). See United States v. 
Festa, 192 F.Supp. 160 (D. Mass. 1960) (no general search 
permitted on basis of warrant for Chick's Bargain Store). 
The opinions in these cases tend to be cryptic, but all 
seem to hold that when polic~re dealing with a commercial -enterprise that may house wrongdoing, they cannot routinely 
assume that customers share that involvement with illegal 
--------~----------------------------------------
operations. There was no problem in assuming that link in 
United States v. Miller, 288 A.2d 34 (D.C.App. 1972), which 
involved an after-hours club where no one answered the door 
after the police announced themselves and the police could 
hear footsteps running away from the door. In the other 
cases cited above, the connection was too remote. The 
general principle was well-articulated by the New Jersey 
Superior Court in State v. Riggins, supra, 351 A.2d at 408: 
"The tavern, although arguably housing an illegal gambling 
operation, was also open to the public for legitimate 
purposes. Both patrons and alleged gamblers frequented the 
premises. It is quite possible that the illicit operations 
were covert in nature and went undetected by the tavern's 
~~k>~e1~ 
1AA- A- '" ~ . . I.JJ. ~ . w ./ ~ ~ .. ~ 
vt-~~~~~ 
various customers. Thus, the mere presence of an l 
individual in a ~place, absent other factors, 1s not 
sufficient to suggest involvement in criminal activity." 
This view is buttressed by the disagreement among 
courts on a police officer's freedom to search individuals 
discovered on the premises of a house or apartment to be 
searched under warrant. Compare United - States v. Branch, 
545 F.2d 177 (D.C.Cir. 1976) (insufficient basis to search 
individual): United States v. Micheli, 487 F.2d 429 (1st 
Cir. 1973) (same, in dictum); State v. Fox, 168 N.W.2d 260 
(Minn. 1969) (same); State v. Bradbury, 243 A.2d 302 (N.H. 
1968) (same); State v. Carufel, 263 A.2d 413 (R.I. 1970) 
(same); Tacoma v. Mundell, 495 P.2d 682 (1972) (same), with 
United States v. Peep, 490 F.2d 903 (8th Cir. 1974) 
(presence in "shooting gallery" apartment sufficient to 
permit search); Willis v. State, 177 S.E.2d 487 (Ga.App. 
1970) (small apartment with people in the same room); 
People v. Pugh, 217 N.E.2d 557 (Ill.App. 1966) (apartment); 
State v. Loudermilk, 494 P.2d 1174 (Kan. 1972) (house); 
Commonwealth v. Smith, 348 N.E.2d 101 (Mass. 1976) (small 
apartment); State v. DeSimone, 288 A.2d 849 (N.J. 1972) 
(automobile). Most of these cases can be harmonized by 
concentrating on the strength of the presumption that all 
those present on the premises must be involved in the 
illegal activity. For example, Carufel involved someone 
attending a large party who might well not have known of 
any unlawful business ordinarily conducted in the 
1 7. 
apartment, while most of the decisions upholding a search 
concern situations where it was reasonable to assume 
knowledge of illegal activity. 
The most influential statement of this approach 
was by Chief Justice Weintraub in DeSimone, supra, which 
upheld the search of a passenger not named in a warrant to 
search a car used in gambling operations -- a fact pattern 
reminiscent of DiRe. The case involved a general warrant, 
so is not directly on point, and I do not agree with its 
outcome. But Weintraub's analysis is relevant here: "On 
principle, the sufficiency of a warrant to search persons 
identified only by their presence at a specified place 
should depend on the facts. A showing that lottery slips 
are sold in a department store or an industrial plant 
obviously would not justify a warrant to search every 
person on the premises for there would be no probable cause 
to believe that everyone there was participating in the 
illegal operation. On the other hand, a showing that a 
dice game is operated in a manhole or in a barn should 
suffice, for the reason that the place is so limited and 
the illegal operation so overt that it is likely that 
everyone present is a party to the offense. Such a setting 
furnishes not only probable cause but also a designation of 
the persons to be searched which functionally is as precise 
as a dimensional portrait of them." 288 A.2d at 850. 
By emphasizing the individual's "physical nexus to 
the ongoing criminal event itself," Chief Justice Weintraub 
1 8 • 
offered a usable standard for monitoring police practices. 
~h' f h 1 f to stress ~ use o t e anguage o ~~ It is important 
~probable c~e. Thus~ his approach should be seen to argue 
simply that a police officer may have probable cause to 
searach an individual found on the premises named in a 
search warrant under certain circumstances -- when illegal 
activity is present and overt, when there is a physical 
nexus between an individual and the activity, and when the 
evidence sought may be concealed easily in clothing. In 
such a situation, if the officer reasonably concludes that 
the individual may flee or the contraband be destroyed 
while a personal search warrant is sought, a search would 
be permissible. 
This position does not expand police discretion in 
executing warrants. It merely acknowledges that a person 
may be searched on probable cause and that a probable cause 
------------~ . 
determination should include factors like the existence of 
l "' a search warrant and the discovery of ' overt illegality in -----the execution of that warrant. Both the vocabulary and the 
analytical methods of traditional Fourth Amendment theory 
would be retained. 
This problem can be discussed in terms of the the 
individual's legitimate "expectation of privacy." At first 
blush, the expectation test seems to generate counter-
intuitive results. The state cases hold that the police 
have stronger justification for searching individuals 
discovered in smaller and more private premises, while 
1 9 • 
ordinarily one would think that a person's expectation of 
privacy is greatest in such circumstances. This apparent 
irrationality can be dispelled by the requirement that 
there be a high probability that the individual is linked 
to ongoing illegal activity. In a small apartment, it is 
unlikely that a person will not know that the person he is 
visiting is a drug dealer. That knowledge would reduce any 
legitimate expectation of privacy. In a tavern, however, 
the link between the individual and the wrongdoing is more 
attenuated, and the legitimate expectation of privacy would 
be correspondingly higher. 
In this case, I do not think that the state showed 
any illegal activity in the Aurora Tap that was so overt 
that any customer would be expected to know about it. 
Accordingly, the circumstances did not establish probable 
> 
cause for the search of Ybarra. I would . not seek a broad 
pronouncement against the Illinois statute, however. Other 
Illinois courts have interpreted the law more narrowly than 
this one did (for example, State v. Miller, reprinted in 
appellee's brief). This Court could take the Connecticut 
approach in reading the requirement that police 
"reasonably" detain or search individuals to involve a 
simple probable cause determination in the context of the 
circumstances of the search. 
B. Detain-and-Question -- As laid out by Judge 
in dicta in United -states -v. -Festa, supra, police 
officers executing a warrant should have the option, in 
20. 
some situations, of asking individuals found on the 
premises to remain there for up to two hours and to respond 
to some questions. The idea is to permit a Terry-type, 
intermediate investigatory technique, where the police 
would have to meet a lower requirement (perhaps "reasonable 
suspicion" rather than probable cause?) in order to impose 
on the individual. 
Judge Wyzanski 's suggestion tracks the procedure 
outlined in the Uniform Arrest Act, Section 2. Although 
the Uniform Act's proposal is not limited to situations 
where the investigating officer is executing a search 
warrant, it does provide an interesting sequence of 
procedures: 
(1) A peace officer may stop any person 
abroad who he has reasonable ground to suspect is 
committing, has committed or is about to commit a 
crime, and may demand of him his name, address, 
business abroad, and whither he is going. 
(2) Any person so questioned who fails 
identify himself or explain his actions to 
satisfaction of the officer may be detained 




( 3) The total period of detention provided 
for by this section shall not exceed two hours. The 
detention is not an arrest and shall not be recorded 
as an arrest in any official record. At the end of 
the detention the person so detained shall be released 
or be arrested and charged with a crime. Warner, The 
Uniform Arrest Act, 28 Va. L. Rev. 315, 344 (1942).---
l This provision 
Hampshire. 
has been enacted in Delaware and New 
As pointed out in Note, 58 Cornell L. Rev. 614 
(1973), and in State v. Wise, supra, a Delaware case, this 
procedure may be particularly well-sui ted to the search 
.. 
21. 
warrant context. It permits the police to prevent 
individuals from absconding with the evidence and grants 
the officers an opportunity to establish the person's 
business on the premises, without authorizing a warrantless 
search. Thus it may be that the detain-and-question 
approach can be jusitified as a "reasonable" search: even 
though it does not involve danger to the policemen as in 
Terry, it allows arguably less intrusive investigatory 
measures. 
Nevertheless, I am not convinced that the Court 
should attempt to impose this procedure in this case. 
There is nothing in this record that would trigger 
consideration of the Uniform Act procedure, and the 
imposition of it could be seen as the sort of judicial 
legislation that should be indulged rarely. We have no 
idea why the procedure has not spread more widely in the 
thirty-seven years since the Uniform Act was promulgated, 
nor how it has worked in Delaware and New Hampshire. 
Finally, it could be unwieldy in operation. 
C. Warrant -for -Detain-and · Question -- A final 
possiblity is that in seeking a warrant to search a 
location, the police could attempt to show that people on 
the premises are likely to be participants in the illegal 
activity. The warrant could then include some 
authorization for questioning of those persons. Even 
assuming that the warrant identified each person in order 
to avoid the evils of the general warrant, I am uneasy with 
22. 
the suggestion. What showing would be required for such 
authorization? It might be difficult to describe a middle-
ground showing that would be appropriate for the intrusion 
contemplated, and to have that standard enforced 
consistently. Magistrates might find it difficult to 
depart from the familiar probable cause calculus without 
abandoning meaningful standards for review of warrant 
applications. It is already uncommon for a magistrate to 
refuse to issue a warrant. A less exacting standard might 
undermine the effectiveness of judicial check on police 
discretion. The price of a "workable" standard might be an 
erosion of the protections of the Fourth Amendment. In 
addition, I am not sure of the need for such a procedure. 
Is there any indication that the policed are handcuffed by 
the current probable cause requirement? How would this 
Court know if there was or wasn't? There is the same 
problem of judicial role as in the Uniform Arrest Act 
context. What is the basis for this Court to propose such 
. 







Mr. Justice Powell (~~) 
David 
Oct. 4, 1979 
Ybarra v. Illinois, No. 78-5937 
Appellant 1 s reply brief responds to appellee 1 s claim that 
the search in the Aurora Tap w9s justified under Terry v. Ohio, 392 
u.s. 1 ( 1968), a claim that was not presented in the courts below. 
Appellant attacks the State 1 s claim that a police officer may pat 
"· down all patrons of a bar when executing a search warrant. Such a 
rule, according to appellant, would expand the Terry stop doctrine 
beyond the limits ·of '' the Fourth Amendment, neglecting the requirement 
specific, articulable facts must give rise to a reasonable suspicion 
before a weapons pat-down is justified. Appellant also argues that 
nothing in the complaint underlying the search warrant would have 
raised such a suspicion, while Officer Johnson testified that he 
observed nothing suspicious in appellant 1 s behavior in the tavern. 
These claims were covered in my initial memorandum in this case. 
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In due course, I will circulate a dissent in this 
case. 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Copies to the Conference 
' ' . '
Sincerely, 
: ro 'he Ch1ef Ju ·f., rl 
Mr. Jus t i ce Br ~n · • 
Mr. Justice W'lte 
Mr. Justice Marshal* 
Mr . Justice Blackmun 
Wr. Jnr;tir,e Pow~'ll 
Mr . ' "0 R l 1 uist 
Mr. JU, ' St f--ns 
From : Mr . Justice Stewart 




SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 78-5937 ~ 
Ventura E. Ybarra, Appellant,] On Appeal for the AppellatA ~ w.UJ 
v. Court of Illinois for the  i 
State of Illinois. Second District. • 
[October - , 1979] 
MR. JusTICE S'I'EWART delivered the opinion of the Court. 
An Illinois statute authorizes law enforcement officers to 
detain and search any person found on premises being 
searched pursuant to a srarch warrant to protect themselves 
from attack or to prevent the disposal or concealment of any-
)~ 
thing described in the warrallt.1 The question before us is 
1 
~ 
whether the application of this statute to the facts of the 
present case violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.~~ 
][ 
On Marcl1 1, 1976, a Special Agent of the Illinois Bureau of 
Investigation presented a "Complaint for Search ·warrant" 
to a judge of an Illinois Circuit f'ourt. The Complaint re-
cited that the Agent had spoken with an informant known 
to the police to be reliable and : 
"3. The informant related ... that over the weekend 
of 28 and 20 February he was in the lAurora Tap Tavern, 
located iu the city of Aurora, Tlli.nois] and observed fif-
"1 Thr ::;talut<• in fl11! '~ l ion i:, 111 Rrv. Slaf., cl1. ~R, § l08-9 (19i l5), 
whirh proddc::; in full : 
" In the Pxcrutwn of the warrant the pcr:>on ext•cuting thr ~amc may 
rrasonnbly detain to ;;car('h :my JH'r~on m tho pla.ce nl the time: 
"(a) To protcrt him,.:f'lf from atlac·k, or 
"(b) To JWr\·ent. thr di ~po;;a l or eonr·rahnent of any inst.rumcntt1, articlcR 
or things pa rticularly de,criLed m the wanant." 
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teen to twenty-five tin-foil packets on the person of the 
bartender 'Greg' and behind the bar. He also has been 
in the tavern on at least ten other occasions and has ob-· 
served tin-foil packets on 'Greg' and in a drawer behind 
the bar. The informant has used heroin in the past and 
knows that tin-foil packets are a common method of 
packaging heroin . 
"4. The informant advised . . that over the week-
end of 28 and 29 February he had a conversation with 
'Greg' and was advised that 'Greg' would have heroin 
for sale on Monday, March 1, 1976. This conversation 
took place in the tavern described." 
On the strength of this Complaint, the judge issued a war-
rant authori:dng the search of "the following person or 
place: ... [T]he Aurora Tap Tavern. . . . Also the person 
of 'Greg,' the bartender, a male white with blondish hair 
appx. 25 years." The warrant authoriz.ed the police to search 
for: "evidence of the offeuse of possession of a coutrolled sub-
stance," to wit, "lh]eroin, contraband, other co11trolled sub-
stances, money, instrumentalities and narcotics, paraphernalia 
used in the manufacture, processing and distribution of con-
trolled substances." 
In the late afternoon of that day, seven or eight officers 
procPeded to the tavern. Upon entering it, the agents an-
nounced their purpose aud advised all those present to stay 
whf're they were, and that they were going to conduct a "cur-
sory search for weapons." One of the officers then proceeded 
to pat down each of the 9 to 13 customers present in the 
tavern, while the remaining officers engaged in an extensive 
search of the premises. 
The police officer who frisked the patrons found the ap-
pellant. Veutura Ybarra, in front of the bar standing by a pin-
ball machine. Iu his first patdown of Ybarra, the officer felt 
what he described as "a cigarette pack with objects in it.'~ 
He did uot remove this pack from Ybarra's pocket. Instead~ 
"78- 5937-0PINION 
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he moved 011 and proceeded to pat down other customers. 
After completing this process the officer returned to Ybarra 
and frisked him once again . This second search of Ybarra 
took place approximately 2 to 10 minutes after the first. The 
officer reloca.ted and retrieved the cigarette pack from Ybarra's 
pants pocket. Inside the pack he found six tinfoil packets 
containiug a brown powdery substance which later turned out 
to be heroin. 
Ybarra was subsequently indicted by an Illinois grand jury 
for the unlawful possession of a controlled substance. He filed 
a pretrial motion to suppress all the contraband that had been 
seized from his person at the Aurora Tap Tavern. At the 
hearing on this motion the State sought to justify the search 
by reference to the Illinois statute in question. The trial 
court denied the tuotiou to suppress, finding that the search 
had been couducted under the authority of subsection (b) 
of the statute, to "prevent the disposal or concealment of 
[the l things particularly described in the warrant." The case 
proceeded to trial before the court sitting without a jury, 
and Ybarra was found guilty of the possession of heroin. 
On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court held that the Illi-
nois statute was not unconstitutional "in its application to 
the facts" of this case. 58 Ill. App. 3d, at 64, 1014 N. E . 
2d, at 1017. The court ackuowledged that, had the warrant 
directed that a "large retail or commercial establishment" be 
searched, the statute could not constitutionally have been 
read to ''authorize a 'blanket search' of persons or patrons 
found'' therein. 58 Ill. App. 3d, at 62, 373 N. E. 2d, at 1016. 
The court iuterpreted the statute as authorizing the search 
of persons found on premises described in a warrant only if 
there is "some showing of a conuection with those premises, 
that the police officer reasouably suspected an attack. or that 
the person searched would destroy or co11ceal items described 
in the warrant." 58 Ill. App. 3d, at 61, 373 N. E. 2d, at 1016. 
Accordingly , the state appellate court found that the search 
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of Ybarra. had be<'n constitutional because it had been "con-
ducted in a one-room bar where it I was l obvious from the 
complaint ... that heroin was heing sold or dispensed," 58 
Ill. App. 3d. at 62, 373 N. E. 2d. at 1016. because "the six 
packets of heroin ... eould <'asily [have been] concealed by 
the dl'fenclant and thus thwart the purpose of the warrant," 
58 Ill. App. 3d, at 61. ::l73 N. E. 2d. at 1016, alld because 
Ybarra was not an "innocent strangerrJ having 110 con11eetion 
whatsoever with the premises." ibid. The court, therefore, 
affirmed Ybarra's conviction, and the IIlinois Supreme Court 
denied Ybarra's petition for leave to appeal. There followed 
an appeal to this Court, and we noted probable jurisdiction. 
-U.S.-. 
II 
There is no reason to suppose that, when the search warrant 
was issued on March 1, 1976, the authorities had probable 
cause to believe that ally person found on the premises of 
the Aurora Tap Tavern, aside from "Greg," would be violat-
ing the law.~ The Complaint for Search Warrant did not 
allege that the bar was frequented bypersons i1le all Jur-
cfiasmg c t]!_gS. c 1 not state tliat t e in ormant had evet· 
sPell a patron of the tavem purchase drugs from "Greg" or 
from any other person. Nowhere, in fact, did the complaint 
even mention the patrons """rthe Aurora Tap av rn. 
Not only was pro )a e causP to search Ybarra absent at the 
time the warrant was issued; it was still abseut when the 
2 The warrant i~l:lltl'll on March 1, 197(:l, did not 1!:-;df authorizt~ lhH 
~e~trc·h of Ybarra or of any othl•r patron found 011 tht> pix·mi;~r::: of lhe 
Aurora Tap Tavem. It dm•eted the pohce to ~l'areh ''the followmg per-
son or place : ... the Aurom Tap Tavem. . . Abo the prr~ou of 
'Greg' ... " Had the I::;suiug jud~~;e iut(•ndPd thnl thP wanaut would or 
could authorize n. :-:Parch of l'Vl'l'~' prr~on found within thr tavf'rn, he 
would hanll.\· have ~JWtifically a nthorized the ~eareh of "Greg" alone. 
"Greg" wa:; n.n tt"mployee of the t.avrl'll, and tllP complaint upon which the 
search warrant was is:>ued gave Hver · llldication that he would be pre;;ent. 
at the tavern on March L 
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1)<·>lice exreuted the warrant. Upou entering the tavern, the 
policP did not recognize Ybarra and had no reason to believe 
that he had committed. was committing or was about to com-
mit auy off€'nse under state or federal law. Ybarra made no 
gestures indicative of criminal conduct, made 110 movements 
that might suggest an attempt to conceal contraband, ancl 
said nothing of a suspicious nature to the police officers. In 
shor-t, the agents knew nothing in particular about Ybarra, 
except that he was prPseut. along with several other customers, 
in a public tavern at a time when the poliee had reason to 
believ€' that the bartender would have heroin for sale. 
It is true that the police possessed a warrant based on 
probable cause to search the tavern in which Ybarra hap-
pened to be at the time the warrant was executed.3 But, a 
person's mere propinquity to others independently suspected 
of eriminal activity does not, without more. give rise to prob-
able cause to search that person. Sibron v. New York, 392 
U. S. 40, 62-63. Where the standard is probable cause, a 
search or seizure of a person must be supported by probable 
cause particularized with respect to that person. This re-
quirement cannot be undercut or avoided by simply pointing 
to the fact that coincidentally there exists probable cause to 
search or seize another or to search the premises where the 
person may happen to be. The Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments protect the "legitimate expectations of privacy" 
of persons. not places. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 
138-143, 148- 149; Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 
351-352. 
Each patron who walked into the Aurora Tap Tavern on 
March 1, 1976, was clothed with constitutional protection 
against an unreasonable search or an uureasonable seizure. 
3 Ybarra eonerdes that the warra11t i:;:;ued on March 1, 1976, was sup-
port.Pd by probable cau:;e in:;ofar as it purported to authonze a sPa rch of 
the prrmi~e~ of the Aurom Tap Tavrm and a search of the per~on of 
''Or<'g," the bartender. 
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That individualized protection was separate and distinct from 
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment protection possessed 
by the proprietor of the tavem or by "Greg." Although the 
search warrant, issued upon probable cause, gave the officers 
authority to search the premises and to search "Greg," it gave 
them 110 authority whatever to invade the constitutional pro-
tections possessed individually by the tavem's customers.4 
Notwithstanding the absence of probable cause to search 
Ybarra, the State argues that the action of the police in 
searching him and seizing what was found in his pocket was 
nonetheless constitutionally permissible. We are asked to 
find that the · first pat-clown search of Ybarra constituted a 
reasonable frisk for weapons under the doctrine of Terry v. 
Oh-io, 392 U. S. 1. If this finding is made, it is then possible 
to conclude, the State a.rgues, that the second search of Ybarra 
was constitutionally justified. The argument is that the pat-
clown yielded probable causf• to beliPve that Ybarra was carry-
ing na.rcotics, and that this probable cause constitutionally 
supported the seco11d search, no warrant being required in 
light of the exigencies of the situation coupled with the ease 
with which Ybarra could have disposed of the illegal substance. 
We are unable to take even the first step required by this 
argument. The initial frisk of Ybarra was simply not sup-
ported by a reasonable belief that he was armed and presently 
dangerous, a belief which this Court has invariably held must 
4 The Fourth Amcnuutcnt. direct, that "uo Warraut., ;,;hall i:;;,;ue, but upon 
probable cau~c ... and partieularly de~cribing th<• plat·e to lw :;earehed, 
~md the per::.oms or thing:; to be :;cizt•d." Thtu;, "upt•n-endt•d" or ·'general" 
warrant!> a.n· coH:stitutioually prohibit.ed. Set' Lo-Ji Sules, Inc. v. New 
York,- U.s.-; Alar.sha/l Y. Barlou•'s. Inc ., 43ti u . S. :~07, au ; Un·ited 
k'itates , .. Cha(ltcil'k, 4aa U. S. 1, 7-8; Stanford v. 'l'e.ca.s, :379 U. S. 47G, 
4l:l0-4l:l2. It follow:,; that a wurntnt to ~<earch a plaee rannot normally 
he const ntPd to ttuthorize a. ,.;<•areh of each individual m that. place. Such l 
::;carclw.s would htwe to bt· >'llpportetl by individualized }Jrobable ca,u::;e, 
and gencrully by 11 warrant :specifically ttllthorizing such :scarchei). 
1 
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form the prerlica.tc to a pat-tlown of a person for weapons." 
Adams v. Willia·rns, 407 U.S. 143, 146; Terry v. Ohio, s·upra, 
392 U. S., at 21-24, 27. When the police entered the Aurora 
Tap Tavern on March 1, 1976, the lighting was sufficient for 
them to observe the customers. Upon seeing Ybarra, they 
neither recognized him as a person with a criminal history 
nor had any particular reason to believe that he might be in-
clined to assault th<'m. Moreover, as police agent Johnson 
later tPstified, Ybarra, whose hands were empty, gave 110 indi-
cation of possessing a weapon, made no gestures or other 
actions indicativr of an intent to commit an assault, and 
acted generally in a maJlller that was not threatening. At 
the suppression hearing, the most ageut Johuson could point 
to was that Ybana was wearing a %-length lumber jacket, 
clothing which the Stat<' admits could be expectf'd 011 almost 
any tavem patron in Illinois in early Ma:rch. ln short. the 
Rtate is unable to articulate any specific fact that would have 
justified a police officer at the scene in even suspecting that 
Ybarra was armed and da11gerous. 
The Terry case created an exception to the requirement of 
probable cause, an exception whose "narrow scope" this 
Court "has been careful to maintain." 6 Under that doctrine 
a law enforcement officer, for his own protection and safety, 
may co11duct a pat down to find weapons that he reasonably 
believes or suspects are then in the possession of the person 
he has accosted. See, e. g., Adams v. Williams, supra (at 
night, in high-crime district, lone police officer approached 
pPrson believed by officer to possess gun and narcotics). 
Nothing in Terry can be understood to allow a generalized 
"cursory search for weapons" or, indeed, any search whatever 
G Siuee we eondude thal the initial pal down uf Ybarra waH not ju~tified 
under the Fourth and .Fourtcl'nth Amcmlnwnt;;, we need not decidt> whether 
or not, the pr<:H!'nc·c on YLa.na'~ per::;on of "a !'igarette pa!'k with objects 
in it" yidd!•d probable cause to believe tha.t Ybarra wm; carrying any 
illegal substance. 
6 D·unaway v. Ne'W Yorl.;,- U.S.-,-. 
78-5937-0PINION 
8 YBARRA v. ILLINOIS 
for anything but weapons. Tlw 11narrow scope" of the Terry 
exception does not permit a frisk for weapons on less than 
reasonable belief or suspicion directf'd at the person to be 
frisked, even though that person happens to be on premises 
where an authorized narcotics search is taking place. 
What has been said largely disposes of the State's second 
aud alternative argument i11 this case. Emphasizing the im-
portant governmental interest "in effectively controlling traf-
fic in dangerous, hard drugs" and the ease with which the 
evidence of narcotics possession may be collcealed or moved 
around from person to person. the State contends that the 
1'erry "reasonable belief or suspicion" standard should be 
made applicable to aid the evidence-gathering function of the 
search warrant. More precisely, we are asked to construe 
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to permit evidence 
searches of persous who, at the commencemeut of the search, 
are on "coutpact" premises subject to a search warrant, at 
least where the police have a "reasonable belief" that such 
persons "are connected with" drug trafficking and "may be 
concealing or carrying away thE' contraband." 
Over 30 years ago, the Court rejected a similar argument 
in United States v. Di Re, 332 U. S. 581 , 583-587. In that 
case, a federal investigator had been told by an informant 
that a transaction in counterfeit gasoline ration coupons was 
going to occur at a particular place. The investigator went 
to that location at the appointed time and saw the car of one 
of the suspected parties to the illegal transaction. The inves-
tigator went over to the car and observed a man in the 
driver's seat, another man (Di Re) in the passenger's seat, 
and the informant in the back. The informaut told the 
inwstigator that the person in the driver's seat had given him 
counterfeit coupons. Thereupon, all three men were arrested 
and searched. Among tlw arguments unsuccessfully advanced 
by the Government to support the constitutionality of the 
search of DiRe was the contention that the investigator could 
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1awfully have searched the car, since he had reasonable cause 
to believe that it contained contraband, and correspondingly 
could have searched any occupant of the car because the con-
traband sought was of the sort "which could easily be con· 
cealed on the person." 7 Not deciding whether or not undet 
the Fourth Amendment the car could have been searched, 
the Court held that it was "not convinced that a person, by 
mere presence in a suspected car, loses immunities from 
search of his person to which he would otherwise be entitled." 8 
The Di Re case does not. of course, completely control the 
case at hand. There the Government investigator was pro-
ceeding without a search warrant, and here the police pos-
sessed a warrant &,uthorizing the search of the Aurora Tap 
Tavern. Moreover, in Di Re the Government conceded that 
its officers could uot search all the persons in a house being 
searched pursuant t.o a search warrant.u The State makes no 
such concession in this case. Yet the governing principle 
in both casers is basically the same, and we follow that prin-
ciple today. The "long prevailing" constitutional standard 
of probable cause embodies " 'the best compromise that has 
been found for accommodating the l] often opposing interests' 
7 United States v. Di Re, 332 U . S. 581, 586. 
8 /d., nt 587. 
0 ''The Govt•rnnwnt. says it would uot, contend that, armed with a search 
warrant, for a rP~idence only, it could search all per~on;; found in it. But 
un oceupant of a houHe could be u::;ed to conceal tin::; contraband on his 
person quite as readily as can an occupant of a car. Ncces::<ity, an argu-
ment advanced in :support of thi::; HearC'h, would seE:'m a:s strong lL reason 
for :;earching guests of a hou:sP for whieh a sParch warrant had i:ssued a:s 
for search of guests in a ear for which none had been j::;::;ued. By a parity 
of rea:;oning with that on which the GuvE:'rnment disclaim~ the right to 
searC'h occupaut~ of a. hou:se, we suppo:>e the Govf'rnmt•nL would not. con-
tend that if it lwd a. valid :-<t'arch warrant for the car only it. could ::;earch 
the oc·eupant,; a.~ an incident to it~ exeeutiou . How then could we ::;ay 
that tht> right to ~enrrh a ear without a warrant confer:; greater latitude 
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m 'safeguard[ing] citizens from rash and unreasonable inter~ 
ferenees with privacy' and in 'seek[ingl to give fair leeway fo( 
enforcing the law in the community's protection.' " 10 
For these reasons, we conclude that the searches of Ybarra 
and the seizure of what was in his pocket contravened the 
Fourth and Fourtee11th Amendments.u Accordingly, the 
judgment is revers<>d and the case is remanded to the Appel-
late Court of Illinois, Second District, for further proceedings 
not inconsistent with this opinion 
I is so ordered, 
10 Duna·way v. New Ym·k,- U.S., at-, quoting Brinega1· v. United 
States, :338 U.S. lGO, 176. 
The eircumstancPs of this ca~e do not remote!~' approaeh tho::;e in which 
the Court ha." :;aid that a ~earrh may be made on Je,.;~ than probable 
tause. Tn addition to Terry \'. Ohio, su]JI'(t, see, e. g., Delatcare \'. Prouse, 
- U. S.-; Marshall v. Badotc's, l11c., 4:H1 P . S. :307; U11ited States v. 
Ma.rtinez-Fui'J'te, 428 L S. 543; South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 
3G4; United States v. Blignoni-P(Inre, 422 U. S . .S73 ; U11ited States v. 
Bis1cell, 406 U. S. :3Jl ; Camara. v. Municipal C'ourt. :387 U. R .12a. 
1t Our dt><·ision last TNm in ,\-Jichigan v. De Fillippo,- U. S. -,does not 
point in a different dirt>diou. Tlwn· we held that. the Fourth and Four-
tt>enth Anwndmcnts ha<l not been violatPCI by nn :urr:st ba:-'ed on a police 
officer':; probable cau,.;e to believe that the suspect had eommitte<l or was 
committmg a ;,mb~tantivP eriminal offcn~c, even though the ~tatutr crenting 
the offpn~P was ~~~h~Pquently declared uncon:,:titutiona.J. HerP, the JlOiice 
officer:< aeted (Jll tlH' strmgth of Ill. Hev. Stat., eh. :38 , § 108-9, but 
that. ,;t:ttute does not defiur thP cl<•mpnt~o~ of a. substantive criminal offen:;e 
under ,:fate hl\1·. The ~tatnt.(• purports instead to anthor;ze thp police in 
some circmnl'it:mrc,<; to make sParches and Hrizures without probabiP r:w~o 
and without seareh warrant:;. Thi::; ~(<tte law, therefon·, f:-dl:; within the 
category of ;;tatutr" purporting to authonze searrlws withont probable 
cau;;e, whirh the Court has not he,;itated to hold invalid as authonty for 
unconstitutional ~Parches . See, e. g., 'l'orres v. Puerto R1co,- U. S.-; 
Alrneicla-8anchez v. U11ited States, 41:3 U. S. 266; S!bron v. New York, 
392 U. S. 40 ; Berger v. New York, 388 U S. 41. 
Justice 
To : 'I' I ) ( 'l< t T ,1 t ? 
Mr . ,Jut. i J L r I n 
Mr. JL :;t lL ") St.:. 'lL ~ " Mr. Ju,,t 1 c· 
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MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting. d:--~ 
On March 1, 1976, agents of the Illinois Bureau of Investi-
gation executed a search warrant in the Aurora Tap in Aurora, ' 
Ill. The warrant was based on information given by a con-
fidential informant who said that he had seen heroin on the 
person of the bartender and in a drawer behind the bar on at 
least ten occasions. Moreover, the informant advised the 
affiant that the bartender would have heroin for sale on 
March 1. The warrant empowered the police to search the 
Aurora Tap and the person of "Greg," the bartender. 
When police arrived at the Aurora Tap, a drab, dimly lit 
tavern, they found about a dozen or so persons standing or 
sitting at the bar. The police announced their purpose and 
told everyone at the bar to stand for a pat-down search. 
Agent Jerome Johnson, the only officer to testify in the 
proceedings below, explained that the initial search was a frisk 
for weapons to protect the officers executing the warrant. 
Johnson frisked several patrons, including petitioner Ybarra. 
During this pat-down, Johnson felt "a cigarette package with 
objects in it" in Ybarra's front pants pocket. He finished 
frisking the other patrons, and then returned to Ybarra. At 
that time, he frisked Ybarra once again, reached into Ybarra's 
pocket, and removed the cigarette package that he had felt 
previously. The package, upon inspection, confirmed the offi-
cer's previously aroused suspicion that it contained not ciga-
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Confronted with these facts, the Court concludes that the 
police were without authority under the warrant to search any 
of the patrons in the tavern and that, absent probable cause 
to believe that Ybarra possessed contraband, the search of 
his person violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
Because I believe that this analysis is faulty, I dissent. 
The first question posed by this case is the proper scope of 
a policeman's power to search pursuant to a valid warrant. 
This Court has had very few opportunities to 'Consider the 
scope of such searches. An early case, Marron v. United 
States, 275 U. S. 192 ( 1927), held that police could not seize 
one thing under a search warrant describing another thing. 
See also Steele v. United States, 267 U. S. 498 (1925) (war-
rant authorizing search of building used as a garage empowers 
police to search connecting rooms). Three other cases, Ber-
ger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967); United States v. Kahn, 
415 U. S. 143 (1974); and United States v. Donovan, 429 
U. S. 413 (1977), examined the scope of a warrant in the 
context of electronic surveillance. A number of cases in-
volving warrantless searches have offered dicta on the subject 
of searches pursuant to a warrant. See, e. g., Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 394, n. 7 (1971) (Fourth 
Amendment confines officer executing a warrant "strictly 
within the bounds set by the warrant"). Closest for our pur-
poses, though concededly not dispositive, is United States v. 
DiRe, 332 U. S. 581, 587 (1948), a case involving the war-
rentless search of an occupant of an automobile. In that case 
the Court suggested that police, "armed with a search warrant 
for a residence only," could not search "all persons found" in 
the residence. 
Faced with such a dearth of authority, it makes more sense 
than ever to begin with the language of the Fourth Amend-
ment itself: 
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
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and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
As often noted, the amendment consists of two independent 
clauses joined by the conjunction "and." See, e. g., Go-Bart 
Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 356-357 (1931). The first 
clause forbids "unreasonable searches and seizures" of "per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects. . . ." The second clause 
describes the circumstances under which a search warrant or 
arrest warrant may issue, requiring specification of the place 
to be searched as well as the persons or things to be seized. 
Much of the modern debate over the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment has focused on the relationship between the rea-
sonableness requirement and the warrant requirement. In 
particular, the central question has been whether and under 
what circumstances the police are entitled to conduct "rea-
sonable" searches without first securing a warrant. As this 
Court has summarized: 
"Some have argued that a determination by a magistrate 
of probable cause as a precondition of any search or 
seizure is so essential that the Fourth Amendment is 
violated whenever the police might reasonably have ob-
tained a warrant but failed to do so. Others have argued 
with equal force that a test of reasonableness, applied 
after the fact of search or seizure when the police attempt 
to introduce the fruits in evidence, affords ample safe-
guard for the rights in question, so that '[t]he relevant 
test is not whether it is reasonable to procure a warrant, 
but whether the search was reasonable.'" Coolidge v. 
New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 474 (1971) , quoting 
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56, 66 (1950). 
MR. JusTICE STEWART explained the current accommodation 
of the two clauses in Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 
357 (1967): "searches conducted outside the judicial process, 
t 
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without prior approval by judge or magistrate, arc per se 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to 
a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." 
See also Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973). 
Here, however, we must look to the language of the Fourth 
Amendment to answer a wholly different question: whether 
and under what circumstances the police may search a person 
present at the place named in a warrant. In this regard, the 
S('COnd clause of the Amendment, by itself, offers no guidance. 
It is merely a set of standards that must be met before a 
search warrant or arrest warrant may "issue." The restric-
tions on a policeman's authority to search pursuant to a 
warrant derive, of course, from the first clause of the Amend-
ment, which prohibits all "unreasonable" searches, whether 
those searches are pursuant to a warrant or not. See Go-
Bart Co. v. United States, supra, at 357. Reading the two 
clauses together, we can infer that some searches or seizures 
are per se unreasonable: searches extending beyond the place 
specified, cf. Steele v. United States, supra, or seizures of 
persons or things other than those specified. Cf. M arran v. 
United States, supra. No such presumption is available to 
Ybarra here, however, because the second clause of the amend-
ment does not require the warrant to specify the "persons" 
to be searched. As this Court has noted in the context of 
electronic surveillance, "'[t]he Fourth Amendment requires 
a warrant to describe only "the place to be searched and the 
persons or things to be seized," not the persons from whom 
things will be seized.' " United States v. Kahn, 415 U. S. 143, 
155, n. 15 (1974), quoting United States v. Fiorella, 468 
F. 2d 688, 691 (CA2 1972). 
Nor, as a practical matter, could we require the police to 
specify in advance all persons that they were going to search 
at the time they execute the warrant. A search warrant is, by 
definition, an anticipatory authorization. The police must 
offer the magistrate sufficient information to confine the 
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search but must leave themselves enough flexibility to react 
reasonably to whatever situation confronts them when they 
enter the premises. An absolute bar to searching persons not 
named in the warrant would often allow a person to frustrate 
the search simply by placing the contraband in his pocket. I 
cannot subscribe to any interpretation of the Fourth Amend-
ment that would support such a result, and I doubt that this 
Court would sanction it if that precise fact situation were· 
before it. 
Recognizing that the authority to search premises must, 
under some circumstances, include the authority to search 
persons present on those premises/ courts and legislatures 
have struggled to define the precise contours of that power. 
Some courts, for example, have required an indication that 
the person searched had a "connection" with the premises. 
Sec, e. g., Purkey v. Mabey, 33 Idaho 281, 193 P. 79 (1920); 
State v. Massie, 95 W.Va. 233, 120 S. E. 514 (1923). These 
courts do not explain, however, what form that connection 
must take or how it might manifest itself to the police. Some 
States have relied on the Uniform Arrest Act, which allows 
police executing a warrant to detain and question a suspicious 
person for up to two hours. See. e. g., State v. Wise, 284 A. 
2cl 292 (Del. 1971 ). Proponents of this approach fail to ex-
plain, however, how detention for questioning will produce 
any hidden contraband. Moreover, in light of the Fourth 
Amendment's requirement that the warrant specify the person 
to be "seized," it is at least arguable that this approach sub-
stitutes a greater constitutional intrusion for a lesser. Several 
other States, Illinois included, have simply passed over the 
constitutional question by identifying the permissible purposes 
1 As even a critic of the appro:tch employed by the court below ad-
mitted, "a realist ic appraisal of the situation f:tring the officer executing 
a search warrant compels the conclusion that under some circumstances a 
right to search occupants of the place named in the warrant is essential." 
LaFave, Search and Seizure: "The Course of True Law ... Has Not ... 
Run Smooth," 1966 Ill. L. Re\'. 266, 272. 
I 
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for a search without specifying the circumstances under which 
that search can be conducted. Illinois' provision, for example, 
permits an officer to search persons present on the named 
premises 
"(a) to protect himself from attack, or 
"(b) to prevent the disposal or concealment of any in-
struments, articles or things particularly described in the 
warrant." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 108-9. 
The generality of these attempts to define the proper limits 
of such searches does not mean of course, that no limits exist. 
A person does not forfeit the protection of the Fourth Amend-
ment merely because he happens to be present during the 
execution of a search warrant. To define those limits, how-
ever. this Court need look no further than the first clause of 
that Amendment and need ask no question other than 
whether, under all the circumstances, the actions of the police 
in executing the warrant were reasonable. Significantly, the 
concept of reasonableness in this context is different from the 
prevailing concept of reasonableness in the context of warrant-
less searches. In that latter context, as noted earlier, there 
is a tension between giving full scope to the authority of 
police to make reasonable searches and the inferred require-
ment that the police secure a judicial approval in advance of 
a search. In the past we have resolved that tension by allow-
ing "jealously and carefully drawn" exceptions to the warrant 
requirement. See Jones v. United States, 357 U. S. 493, 499 
(1958); Katz v. United States, supra, at 357. The rationale 
for drawing these exceptions closely is obvious. Loosely 
drawn, they could swallow the warrant requirement itself. 
In this case. however, the warrant requirement has been 
fully satisfied. As a result, in judging the reasonableness of 
the search pursuant to the warrant, we need not measure it 
against jealously drawn exceptions to that requirement. Only 
once before, to my kno\vledge, has this Court been relieved of 
concern for the warrant requirement to the extent that we 
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could give full scope to the notion of reasonableness. In 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), this Court •considered the 
applicability of the Fourth Amendment to an on-the-street 
encounter between a policeman and three men who had 
aroused his suspicions. In upholding the ensuing "stop and 
frisk," this Court found the warrant requirement completely 
inapposite because "on-the-spot" interactions between police 
and citizens "historically [have] not been, and as a practical 
matter could not be, subjected to the warrant procedure.'' 
392 U. S., at 20. The conduct in question had to be judged 
solely under "the Fourth Amendment's general proscription 
against unreasonable searches and seizures." Ibid. 
The petitioner in Terry had sought a "rigid aU-or-nothing 
model of justification and regulation under the [Fourth] 
Amendment," a model allowing the police to search some in- · 
dividuals completely and other individuals not at all. Such 
a model, however, would have overlooked "the utility of limi-
tations upon the scope, as well as the initiation, of police 
actions as a means of constitutional regulation." 392 U. S., 
at 17. This Court, therefore, opted for a flexible model bnl-
ancing the scope of the intrusion against its justification: 
"In order to assess the reasonableness of [the challenged 
sea.rch] as a general proposition, it is necessary 'first to 
focus upon the governmental interest which allegedly 
justifies the official intrusion upon the constitutionally 
protected interests of the private citizen ,' for there is 'no 
ready test for determining reasonableness other than by 
balancing the need to search [or seize] aga.inst the inva-
sion which the search r or seizure] entails.'" 392 U. S. 
at 21, quoting Camara. v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 
534-535, 536-537 ( 1967). 
In the present case, Ybarra would have us eschew such flex-
ibility in favor of a rule allowing the police to search only 
those persons on the premises for whom the police have prob-
able cause to believe that they possess contraband. Presum-
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ably, such a belief would entitle the police to search those per-
sons completely. But such a rule not only reintroduces the 
rigidity condemned in Terry, it also renders the existence of 
the search warrant irrelevant. Given probable cause to be-
lieve that a person possesses illegal drugs, the police need no 
warrant to conduct a full body search. They need only arrest 
~son and conduct the search incident to that arrest. 
- ~ee _'--'_nJ.mel v. California, 395 U. S. 752, 763 ( 1969). It 
should not matter, of course, whether the arrest precedes the 
search or vice versa. See, e. g., United States v. Gorman, 355 
F. 2d 151, 159 (CA2 1965); Holt v. Simpson, 340 F. 2d 853, 
856 (CA7 1965). 
As already noted, I believe it error to analyze this case as 
if the police were under an obligation to act within one of 
the narrow exceptions to the warrant requirement, yet this is 
precisely what Ybarra would have us do. Whereas in Terry 
the warrant requirement was inapposite, here the warrant re-
quirement has been fully satisfied. In either case we should 
give full scope to the reasonableness requirement of the first 
clause of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, in judging the rea-
sonableness of a search pursuant to a warrant, which search 
extends to persons present on the named premises, this Court 
should consider the scope of the intrusion as well as its 
justification. 
Viewed sequentially, the actions of the police in this case 
satisfy the scope/justification test of reasonableness established 
by the first clause of the Fourth Amendment as interpreted 
in Terry. The police entered the Aurora Tap pursuant to 
the warrant and found themselves confronting a dozen people, 
all standing or sitting at the bar, the suspected location of 
the contraband. Because the police were aware that heroin 
was being offered for sale in the tavern, it was quite rea:son-
able to assume that any one or more of the persons at the 
bar could have been im·olved in drug trafficking. This as-
sumption, by itself, might not have justified a full-scale search 
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of all the individuals in the tavern. Nevertheless, the police 
also were quite conscious of the possibility that one or more 
of the patrons could be armed in preparation for just such an 
intrusion. In the narcotics business. "firearms are as much 
'tools of the trade' as are most commonly recognized articles 
of narcotics paraphernalia." United States v. Oates, 560 F. 
2d 45, 62 (CA2 1977). The potential danger to the police 
executing the warrant and to innocent individuals in this 
dimly lit tavern cannot be minimized. By conducting an 
immediate frisk of those persons at the bar, the police elimi-
nated this danger and "froze" the area in preparation for the 
search of the premises. 
Ybarra contends that Terry requires an "individualized" 
suspicion that a particular person is armed and dangerous. 
·while this factor may be important in the case of an on-the-
street stop, where the officer must articulate some reason for 
singling the person out of the general population, there are 
at least two reasons why it has less significance in the present 
situation, where execution of a valid warrant had thrust 
the police into a confrontation with a small, but potentially 
dangerous, group of people. First. in place of the requirement 
of "individualized suspicion" as a guard against arbitrary 
exercise of authority, we have here the determination of a · 
neutral and detached magistrate that a search · necessary. 
As this Court noted in Fisher v. United States, 425 U. S. 391 , 
400 (1976), the Framers of the Fourth Amendment "struck 
a balance so that when the State's reason to believe incrimi-
nating evidence will be found becomes sufficiently great, the 
invasion of privacy becomes justified and a warrant to search 
and seize will issue." The question then becomes ';vhether, 
given the initial decision to intrude, the scope of the intrusion 
is reasonable. 
In addition , the task performed by the officers executing a 
search warrant is inherently more perilous than is a IBOt~ta:ry-l)'Yioi'VI01~')' l 
encounter on the street. The danger is greater "not only 
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because the suspect and the officer will be in close proximity 
for a longer period of time, but also ... because the officer's 
investigative responsibilities under the warrant require him to 
direct his attention to the premises rather than the person." 
W. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 4.9, at 150-151 (1978). To 
hold a police officer in such a situation to the same standard 
of "individualized suspicion" as might be required in the 
cnse of an on-the-street stop would defeat the purpose of 
gauging reasonableness in terms of all the circumstances sur-
rounding an encounter. 
Terry suggests an additional factor that courts must con-
sider when confronting an allegedly illegal frisk for weapons. 
As this Court admitted in that case, "[t]he exclusionary rule 
has it-s limitations ... as a tool of judicial 'Control." 392 
U. S. , at 13. Premised as that rule is on the hypothesis that 
polirc will a.void illegal searches if threatened with exclusion 
of the fruits of such searches, "it is powerless to deter inva-
sions of constitutionally guaranteed rights where the police 
either have no interest in prosecuting or are willing to forgo 
surrrssful prosecution in the interest of serving some other 
p:oal." I d., at 14. Where. as here, a preliminary frisk is 
based on an officer's well-honed sense of self-preservation, I 
have little doubt that "the r exclusionary] rule is ineffective as 
a deterrent." ld., at 13. 
Measured against the purpose for the initial search is the 
scope of that search. I do not doubt that a pat-down for 
weapons is a substantial intrusion into one's privacy. See 
Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 17, n. 13. Nevertheless, such an in-
trusion was more than justified, under the circumstances here. 
by the potential threat to the lives of the searching officers and 
innocent bystanders. In the rubric of Terry itself. a "man of 
reasonable caution" would have been warranted in the belief 
that it was appropriate to frisk the 12 or so persons in the 
virinity of the bar for weapons. See 392 U. S., at 21-22 . . 
Thus, the initial frisk of Ybarra was legitimate. 
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During this initial pat-down, Officer Johnson felt something 
suspicious: a cigarette package with objects in it. The record 
below is not entirely clear as to the shape or texture of the 
objects, but it is clear that Officer Johnson had at least a sub-
jective suspicion that the objects were packets of heroin like 
those described in the warrant. He testified, for example, 
that after patting down the other persons at the bar, he re-
turned directly to Ybarra to search him "for controlled sub-
stances." App., at 499. At this point, he reached into 
Ybarra's pants pocket, removed the cigarette pa:ckage, and 
confirmed his suspicion. 
While the test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amend-
nwnt is necessarily objective as opposed to subjective, see 
T erry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. , at 21-22, Officer Johnson's subjective 
suspicions help fill out his cryptic description of the "objects" 
that he felt in Ybarra's pocket. The objects clearly did not 
feel like cigarettes.2 In this case we need not decide whether, 
as a general rule, an officer conducting an on-the-street frisk 
under Terry can carry his search into the pockets of a suspect 
to examine material that he suspects to be contraband. We 
are dealing here with a case where the police had obtained a 
warrant to search for precisely the item that Officer Johnson 
suspected was present in Ybarra's pocket. Whether Officer 
Johnson's level of certainty could be labeled "probable cause," 
"reasonable suspicion ," or some indeterminate, intermediate 
level of cognition, the limited pursuit of his suspicions by 
extracting the item from Ybarra's pocket was reasonable. 
Tho justification for the intrusion was linked closely to tho 
terms of the search warrant; tho intrusion itself was carefully 
tailored to conform to its justification . 
~ In fact, Officer John~on did trstify tha t. the objects felt exa ctly like 
what thry wrre: heroin . Sec App. , p. 9 ("I frlt some objects th :1 t 1 fr lt 
1 o be heroin" ). Sre also App., p . 50 ("I felt objects in his porket whi c·h 
1 bclirved-") . In both cnsrs defen se counsel interposed objections to 
OfTi rr r Johnson's characterization of the objects, which objections the trial 
rourt sustained. 
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The courts below reached a similar conclusion. The trial 
court noted correctly that "[i]t might well not be reasonable 
to search 350 people on the first floor of Marshall Field. but 
we're talking about, by description, a rather small tavern." 
Sec App., p. 43. The question, as understood by the trial 
court, was tho "reasonableness" of the intrusion under all the 
surrounding circumstances. Ibid. The Illinois Court of 
Appeals agreed. In an earlier case. People v. Pugh, 69 Ill. 
App. 2d 312, 217 N. E. 2d 557 (1969), the Court of Appeals 
hacl concluded that the police acted reasonably in searching 
the brother of the owner of the named premises during the 
execution of a search warrant for narcotics. According to the 
Court of Appeals in that case, "[t]he United States Constitu-
tion prohibits unreasonable searches ... ; the search of Ray-
monel Pugh under the circumstances of this case cannot be so 
classified." I d., at 316. 217 N. E. 2d, at 559. In this case, 
the Court of Appeals relied expressly on the holding and rea-
soning in Pugh and found no constitutional violation in the 
i'iearches of Ybarra. These findings should not be overturned 
lightly. 
I would conclude that Officer Johnson, acting under the 
authority of a valid search warrant, did not exceed the rea-
sonable scope of that "·arrant in locating and retrieving the 
heroin secreted in Ybarra's pocket. This is not a case where 
Ybarra's Fourth Amendment rights were at the mercy of 
overly zealous officers "engaged in the often competitive enter-
prise of ferreting out crime." Johnson v. United States, 333 
U. S. 10, 13-14 (1948). On the contrary, the need for a 
search was determined, as contemplated by the second clause 
of the Fourth Amendment, by a neutral and detached magis-
trate, and the officers performed their duties pursuant to their 
warrant in an appropriate fashion. The Fourth Amendment 
requires nothing more. 
CHAMBERS OF 
.J USTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
£;n~ ~tttttt nf tqt )lnitth ~bdt.s 
Jlagfttng~ ~- <II· 2Ll~"~ 
October 30, 1979 
Re: No. 78-5937 - Ybarra v. Illinois 
Dear Potter, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Copies to the Conference 
erne 
October 30, 1979 
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Dear Potter: 
If we can resolve one small problem, I will be 
happy to join your opinion. 
There are situations where I think perhaps all of 
us would agree that police, on the basis of a proper warrant, 
could search everyone in a particular place without an 
individualized warrant. 
Examples include a place used by "pushers" to pick 
up their quota of heroin1 an unlicensed gambling operation, a 
place that "fences" stolen goods7 house of prostitution, etc. 
Although your opinion is narrowly written, it may 
be prudent to make clear that this is not the kind of case 
mentioned above. Indeed, it seems to me that at least 
arquably the last sentence in note 4 (page 6) might be 
construed as precluding the search of anyone in the absence 
of an individualized showing of probable cause. 
What would you think of substituting for that 
sentence something along the following lines: 
"The warrant for the Aurora Tap Tavern provided no 
basis for departing from the usual rule that a 
warrant to search a place does not authorize a 
search of unnamed individuals in that place. 
Consequently, we need not consider situations where 
the search of unnamed persons in a place may be 
justified pursuant to a warrant stating probable 
cause to believe that persons who frequent the 
engaging therein in 
activity." 
Sincerely, 
j\n:pr.tnu ~omt ttf f4.t ~ ~btt.tS' 
Jfag.frhtghtn. ~. <!f. 2ll,?~~ 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
October 30, 1979 
Dear Potter: 
Please join me. 
Respectfully, 
) ktLtt~vv, 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Copies to the Conference 
/ 
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... MJringhnt. ~. C!J. 2.l!~J!~ 
CHAMBERS OF" 
..JUSTICE w ... ..J. BRENNAN, ..JR. October 30, 1979 




Mr. Justice Stewart 
cc: The Conference 
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/ 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
Re: 78-5937 - Ybarra v. Illinois 
Dear Bill: 




Mr Justice Rehnquist 
cc: The Conference 
November 1, 197 9 
.§n:pr.rmt <.qo1trt of tire ~ttlt ~tatts 
'Ulaalriugtou. ;ID. <.q. 20bl'J.;1 
CHAMBERS Of' 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
November 8, 1979 
Re: No. 78-5937 - Ybarra v. Illinois 
Dear Potter: 
Please join me. 
Mr. Justice Stewart 






THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
$ittprttn:t <!Jcurl of t~t 'Jlhtitt~ ~taftg 
~aglfi:nghtn. ~- <!}. 2ll.;t~~ 
November 20, 1979 
Re: 78-5937 - Ybarra v. Illinois 
Dear Bill: 
I 
I am generally in accord with your careful, 
analytical dissent but I also have a "bone in my 
throat" on the subject that will not quite go down or up. 
I hope to have something put together and ready later 
today. As I often do with concurring opinions I write 
out, this one may not see the light of day. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAM8ERS OF" 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
~u:.punu <!fnurl Ltf t~t ~lt ~ta.f:tg 
~lUllpngi:Ltn. ~· (!}. 20.?)1.~ 
November 23, 1979 
Re: 78-5937 - Ybarra v. Illinios 
Dear Bill: 
/ 
Pl~ase join me in your dissent~ I have decided 
also to publish one of my own~ 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
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